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The Governance of Mandated Partnerships: the Case of Social Housing Procurement 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Partnership working is nowadays a seemingly ubiquitous aspect of the management and delivery 
of public services, yet there remain major differences of opinion about how they best work for 
the different stakeholders they involve. The balances between mandate and trust, and between 
hard and soft power, are crucial to current debates about public service partnerships. This paper 
explores the example of social housing procurement  in Northern Ireland, and the requirement  to 
form mandated procurement groups. The research shows that the exercise of hierarchical power 
is still important in network governance; that mandated partnerships alter the balance between 
trust and power in partnership working, but the impact is uneven; and that these relationships are 
(re)shaping the ‘hybrid’ identity of housing associations. The balance between accountability for 
public resources and the independence of third sector organisations is the key tension in 
mandated partnerships. The Northern Ireland experience suggests that trust-based networks 
could provide more productive working relationships in partnerships for service delivery. 
 
Keywords:  housing associations, housing investment, hybrid organisations, network governance, 
Northern Ireland, social housing procurement. 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Partnership working is nowadays a seemingly ubiquitous aspect of the management and delivery 
of public services, yet there remain major differences of opinion about what partnerships are for 
and how they best work for the different stakeholders they involve. The procurement process for 
new social housing has been under scrutiny in all four United Kingdom jurisdictions and a focus 
on achieving greater efficiency has led to a variety of consortium and partnership-based 
approaches by housing associations. This paper reports on research into the approach to social 
housing procurement adopted in Northern Ireland’s Procurement Strategy for the Social Housing 
Development Programme (DSD, 2008) and enacted between 2009 and 2013. In particular, we 
focus on the consequences of the requirement for associations to join together in procurement 
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groups in order to be eligible for inclusion in the Programme. Procurement groups may be 
described as ‘mandated partnerships’ (Rees et al 2012a) in that there is an external condition to 
which organisations within the partnerships must have regard, and this may reduce the voluntary 
nature of the partnership and ability of members to determine activities and outcomes through 
internal agreement alone. Indeed Davies (2002) has argued that seemingly voluntary partnerships 
often mask the use of hierarchical power by the central state to orchestrate and control, and Rees 
et al (2012a) argued that mandated partnerships have become a common form of incorporation of 
third sector organisations into public service delivery. We examine the implications of mandated 
partnerships for housing associations as hybrid third sector organisations located in a complex 
policy field, in which hierarchical control is combined with network relationships. The topic 
addresses three trends of international significance: the marketisation of public service delivery 
through various forms of competition and contracting out (Newman and Clarke, 2009); the 
implications of this approach for public procurement (Harland et al, 2013); and the impact of the 
changing organisational environment on social housing providers (Mullins et al, 2012). 
 
The social housing policy environment in Northern Ireland presents an example of network 
governance. Housing policy is one of a wide range of functions devolved from the UK 
Government to the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive in 1999 (Muir, 2013). Social 
housing policy is the responsibility of the Department for Social Development (DSD), reporting 
to the Minister for Social Development in the Northern Ireland Executive. Social housing is 
owned and managed by the Northern Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE) and by housing 
associations; both types of providers are run by appointed boards and are regulated by the DSD. 
The Housing Executive also manages delivery of the Social Housing Development Programme. 
Housing associations build new social housing, bidding for state funding to the Housing 
Executive through recently formed procurement groups (the main subject of this study) and 
borrowing the balance of the required funds from private lenders. In common with the rest of the 
United Kingdom (UK), this borrowing now accounts for the major source of finance for new 
build and does not count as public expenditure under government rules (Mullins and Pawson, 
2010). Most of Northern Ireland’s housing associations were established in the mid-1970s and 
their origins were as small landlords with distinct identities and connections to local 
communities. Growth occurred under the ‘mixed funding’ regime from 1992 (when borrowing 
from private lenders was introduced) and again from 1996 when the NIHE new build programme 
was transferred to housing associations (Mullins et al, 2001). At the time of the research the 
Housing Executive  was responsible for 89,000 properties, with a further 30,000 homes and 
4,500 non self-contained units managed by 30 registered housing associations. The nine largest 
housing associations owned 77 per cent of all housing association stock (NIHE, 2013).  
 
The research reported in this paper explored the nature and operation of social housing 
procurement groups as a mandated form of third sector partnership. This was done through 
reviewing the characteristics of third sector partnerships, tracing the different responses to 
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procurement policy requirements within the United Kingdom, establishing the key drivers for 
Northern Ireland’s procurement groups, assessing their operation, relative advantages and any 
barriers to their effectiveness, and considering any innovation and learning present in the 
process. The research was undertaken in two phases in 2011 and 2012 and was part of a larger 
study for the Northern Ireland Housing Executive (Mullins et al, 2013). The research included a 
literature review and a review of social housing procurement policy across the UK; stakeholder 
interviews; and the selection of two out of the three procurement groups for closer study over the 
two years, including a total of 34 semi-structured interviews. Those interviewed included: senior 
staff in housing associations; housing association and umbrella body Board members; staff from 
two housing umbrella organisations; Government bodies including the Housing Executive, the 
Department for Social Development (DSD) and the Northern Ireland Audit Office; and a 
financial institution. Interviews were confidential and anonymised, as were the two procurement 
group (PG) case studies, referred to in this paper as PG1 and PG2. PG1 consisted of seven 
housing associations with a total of 7,203 units; PG2 had five members with 8,640 units. The 
groups were chosen due to their different organisational structures, working relationships, and 
initial attitudes towards the policy: PG1 had embraced the new approach with great enthusiasm 
whereas PG2 was more pragmatic.  
 
The paper continues with an account of mandated partnerships, hybrid organisations and network 
governance in the social housing policy field, which addresses the implications of uneven trust 
levels and power inequalities for the successful operation of multi-sector service delivery 
partnerships. Next, a short review of procurement policy across the UK sets the scene for a report 
of the research findings including context, structure, processes and outcomes. The conclusion 
assesses the impact of mandated partnerships on the hybridisation of housing associations in the 
case study and reflects more generally on factors shaping the hybrid identity of third sector 
organisations. 
 
Mandated partnerships, hybrid organisations and network governance 
 
Partnership has been defined as ‘at least two agencies with common interests working together, 
in a relationship characterised by some degree of trust, equality and reciprocity’ (Rees et al, 
2012a: 14). This contrasts  with market-based, contractual relationships which are assumed to be 
low trust and adversarial in nature, although there are exceptions (ibid.). Earlier, Sullivan and 
Skelcher (2002: 83) had argued that the move from short term contracts to longer term relational 
partnerships for delivery of public services was motivated by the expectation that ‘trust and 
mutuality will replace the suspicion and divergence of interests found in traditional short-term 
contracting’. However, the use of mandated partnerships for public sector service delivery has 
increasingly displaced trust based partnerships through the introduction of external conditions 
and controls, with legislative and regulatory mechanisms to encourage partnerships (Hudson, 
1999). In several countries, including the UK, collaboration between organisations became a 
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precondition of funding by both government and charitable foundations (Keast and Brown, 
2006). This introduced new forms of vertical-horizontal inter-organisational relations, referred to 
by Rees at al (2012a: 16) as ‘mandated horizontal collaboration’. 
 
Armistead and Pettigrew (2008: 23) list the characteristics of mandated partnerships, including: 
‘ambiguous’ governance and accountability arrangements; agreement reached by compromise 
rather than consensus; the importance of ‘state power and control’ within the partnership 
dynamics; ‘a ‘tick box’ approach to structure and process’; the specification of partners by the 
funder of the service, with little opportunity to change this; a limited identification with the 
partnership by its members; time limited partnerships dependent on funding; prescriptive 
processes and strict measurement of outputs and outcomes; hierarchical structures are more 
important than the partnership network; and that partnerships have an external focus including an 
‘overtly political and public’ identity. Armistead and Pettigrew (2008) usefully contrast these 
features with those of voluntary partnerships in which there is more of an intrinsic sense of 
ownership, leading to more innovative practice and processes that are devised to suit the needs of 
partners, with consensus-based decision-making and more flexible structures. There are doubts 
in the literature about whether management of networks and partnerships can function effectively 
with hierarchically imposed objectives or whether, in partnership processes, goals are necessarily 
emergent and based on shared learning between actors (de Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof, 2008). 
 
Hybrid organisations 
 
‘Hybrid’ organisations ‘possess significant characteristics of more than one sector’ (Billis, 
2010a: 3; see also reviews by Billis, 2010b; Mullins et al, 2012; Skelcher, 2012). The increasing 
use of third sector organisations as service delivery agencies under New Labour from 1997 
onwards was an important contributing factor to the emergence of hybridity in these 
organisations (Harris, 2010). Organisational hybridity, involving various combinations of public, 
private and third sectors, is a logical outcome of a mixed economy of service provision and 
funding, and is sometimes considered as a purposeful adaptive response by organisations to a 
turbulent environment, for example by charities moving to more market based methods of 
income generation (Smith, 2010). The importance of external drivers arising from change in the 
public policy and funding environment is also increasingly recognised (Harris 2010). 
Hybridisation impacts on the dynamics of policy networks; it changes the identity or perceived 
identity of organisations; and it can blur organisational identity and primary rationale (Mullins et 
al, 2012). The stresses and strains involved in adopting multiple roles and perspectives lead to 
new organisational and management challenges. Hybrid organisations have been described as ‘... 
combining and condensing different forms of power and authority... cross cut by multiple goals, 
forms of internal governance, and organisational practices and relationships’ (Newman and 
Clarke, 2009: 94).  
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Housing associations exemplify hybrid organisations, operating between state, market and civil 
society and including a mix of commercial and social logics with institutional and cultural 
dimensions (Mullins and Pawson, 2010; Blessing, 2012). This does not mean that housing 
associations have ceased to be part of the third sector – rather, it is the nature of their internal 
operations and culture that are changing. They may still have a ‘principal ownership’ (Billis, 
2010b) as civil society organisations, but they are increasingly subject to influences from both 
the state and the market, navigating the different rules of social benefit and commercial activity 
(Blessing, 2012). They are ‘chameleon-like in their ability to present themselves as the private 
sector for funding purposes, the voluntary sector when community partnerships are required and 
the public sector when accountability is at stake’ (Mullins and Murie, 2006: 187). The hybrid 
model has often been presented as a source of organisational strength for associations, giving 
them the ability to trade and to exploit their asset base to cross-subsidise social objectives, 
although, as Blessing (2012: 205) has observed in an international context, the hybrid 
characteristics of housing organisations may be ‘not so much a super-blend as a balancing act’. 
 
Northern Ireland’s housing associations are highly regulated and have been deemed as ‘public 
bodies’ in relation to equalities legislation and for public procurement purposes. At the same 
time they have developed elements of a more commercial culture (such as business planning) 
underpinned by their access to private finance. The rationale for the transfer of the new build 
programme from the Housing Executive to housing associations in the 1990s was partly founded 
on associations’ ability to borrow without the loans counting as public expenditure. The 
Housing Executive manages and monitors the new build programme and the Department for 
Social Development (DSD) has responsibility for policy, regulation and, in cases of poor 
performance, intervention: for example suspending seven associations from the new build 
programme in 2010 (NIAO, 2009). In the light of the regulatory regime, justified on grounds of 
receipt of grant aid, it is interesting that the Procurement Strategy included the statement: 
‘Housing Associations are non-profit making private sector businesses’ (DSD, 2008: 6). In the 
face of competing influences from state and market, the civil society origins of associations have 
diminished - but remain  important to some, and ‘principal ownership’ within civil society 
remains. The Northern Ireland Federation of Housing Associations (NIFHA), the region’s 
umbrella body for housing associations, has links with the wider third sector and with social 
economy organisations, but the third sector identity of housing associations had been given less 
emphasis in the period preceding this study. For example, little part was played by housing 
associations in discussions around the Concordat that set a framework for relations between 
Government departments and the third sector (DSD, 2011).  
 
Trust and power in network governance 
 
Hybrid organisations operating partnerships for service delivery function within network 
governance structures which nowadays include public, private and third sector organisations. 
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Network governance has become a dominant discourse over the past thirty years in management 
studies, political science and social science (e.g. Frances et al, 1991; Rhodes, 1997; Kickert et 
al,1997; Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004; Davies, 2011) and has had particular importance for the 
incorporation of non-state actors into the delivery of public services (Carmel and Harlock 2008; 
Rees et al, 2012a). Some authors have differentiated networks from hierarchies and markets as 
forms of co-ordination (Thompson, 2003) and highlighted the importance of trust as the key 
currency of this form of network co-ordination (Frances et al 1991). Kooiman (2003) 
distinguishes ‘hierarchical governance’, in which a top down approach can be either steering or 
controlling, from the more trust-based concepts of ‘co-governance’ by collaboration and co-
operation of multi-sector networks or regimes and the more civil society-based ‘self-governance’ 
by independent organisations.  
 
But what does the presence of trust in governance networks mean in practice? Klijn et al (2010) 
set out four advantages: reduction of transaction costs through less need for detailed contract 
specification; an increase in co-operative working relationships leading to greater ‘probability 
that actors will invest their resources’ (p.197) in the network; a related increased in learning and 
information sharing; and a greater chance of innovative activity, because network participants do 
not believe others will act opportunistically. To summarise, ‘trust leads to more information and 
knowledge exchange, which results in an enhanced problem-solving capacity, new insights, 
innovative power, and better outcomes’ (Klijn et al, 2010: 198). Interestingly, Klijn et al (2010) 
found no connection between the complexity of the project and the benefits of higher trust levels: 
a simple project required as much trust as any other. 
 
A second crucial component of the analysis of network governance is power, which has been 
analysed extensively in the organisational literature (see Clegg et al, 2006, for a review). Clegg 
et al (2006) consider two concepts of relevance to network governance: circuits of power, and 
the difference between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power. The circuits of power typology demonstrates 
how the exercise of power in individual exchanges (‘episodes’) influences rules and meaning in 
organisational fields and thus power relations between actors. While all participants have some 
degree of power at some point, network governance discourse is underpinned by a strong 
assumption of the decentring of power from the state to self-organising networks (Stoker, 1998). 
For example, according to Kickert et al (1997), the need for network management is keenest 
where no single actor has the funding or power necessary to steer and therefore trust is required 
to reach shared decisions and take collective action (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004). Citing Deakin 
and Taylor (2002), Davies notes that network governance has generally been positively viewed, 
as ‘the network potentially unlocks the ‘third space’ between state and market, extending the 
public sphere, empowering communities and cultivating inclusive policy making’ (Davies, 2011: 
2).  
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However, the concept of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power provides a more cautionary note. Hard power 
uses coercion, for example penalties for failing to follow rules; soft power involves the use of 
persuasion (Clegg et al, 2006). Although network governance has been associated with the use of 
soft power, Davies (2011:5) has revisited that assumption on the basis that, following Gramsci 
(1971), ‘coercion is the immanent condition of consent inherent in capitalist modernity’. Davies 
(2011:3) asks why ‘networked governance institutions look very like the modernist hierarchies 
they were supposed to replace’ and concludes that previous analyses have failed to recognise the 
important of hard power in governance networks, in particular the role of the state (see also 
Bevir and Rhodes 2010; Stoker, 2011). Newman and Clarke (2009) explain how state power is 
exerted in the more dispersed systems of the regulatory state: first through the retention of 
‘power to organise sites, scales, spaces and relationships, and to allocate forms of power to 
different agents’ (p.104); and secondly through the prioritisation of managerialism and the 
depoliticisation of decision-making as templates of organisational practice. 
 
The effectiveness of partnerships in network governance structures 
 
Nevertheless, UK governments have continued to incorporate third sector organisations into 
public service delivery, promoting trust based partnerships through, for example, compacts 
between government and the third sector (Zimmeck, 2010; DSD, 2011), but using power and 
coercion through targets and financial leverage (Rees et al, 2012a). Inequalities of power, limited 
trust and collaborative capacity, and lack of legitimacy can give a dark side to partnerships. Trust 
and power pull in different directions in network governance. Partnerships attempt to establish 
trust based consensus, but in reality, according to Davies (2011), when interests align, they do so 
to the benefit of the most powerful stakeholders. The specific case of mandated partnerships can 
cause ‘a tendency to try to make the partnership work by following a sets of prescriptions or 
check lists which might satisfy government, but which fail to address the dynamics of 
partnership performance and the causes of partnership failure’ (Armistead and Pettigrew, 2008: 
22); in addition, externally imposed targets can create perverse incentives that weaken genuine 
collaboration (Rees et al, 2012a). 
 
Despite a decade of attempts to evaluate partnership outcomes, the evidence of effectiveness is 
thin. There is growing recognition that the achievement of externally imposed goals can be a 
limited way of assessing benefits; partnerships may succeed in terms of process but fail to 
deliver prescribed outcomes. On the other hand, alternative approaches to evaluation based on 
joint interest goals that emerge from partnership working may place too great a weight on the 
interests of partners rather than the wider public interest (Rees et al, 2012b; ESRC, 2013). The  
development of Northern Ireland’s social housing procurement groups provides an interesting 
arena in which to explore the relative importance of trust and power in networks. The effective 
operation of housing associations as hybrid organisations within these structures presents a 
considerable challenge. In the Northern Ireland context an official  report acknowledges that: 
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‘An effective relationship between  the Sector and public bodies, built around partnership and 
mutual trust and respect is essential. However this has not always been the case’ (NIA, 2012:1). 
 
Social housing procurement policy in the United Kingdom 
 
Much of the impetus for change to Northern Ireland’s social housing procurement process came 
from outside the region, and from outside social housing policy. The most important driver was 
the European Union (EU) Procurement Directive, enacted in 2006 with amendments in 2009 and 
2011. Housing Associations count as public sector bodies for procurement purposes under Public 
Sector Directive 2004/18. Public procurement is a devolved matter but in Northern Ireland it is 
implemented in close conjunction with other UK jurisdictions under the terms of a 2001 
Concordat between the Northern Ireland Executive and the UK Government. However  each 
jurisdiction has approached the procurement of social housing in different ways. A second 
influence was the UK-wide concern for greater efficiency in construction, which was supported 
in Northern Ireland through the Achieving Excellence initiative, the principles of which were 
incorporated into procurement guidance (DFP, 2012). Finally, social housing policy across the 
UK has placed a greater emphasis on regulation of housing association performance since  
associations became responsible for a larger proportion of social housing due to stock transfer (in 
Great Britain) and sole responsibility for new development (Mullins and Murie, 2006). 
 
Social housing procurement in the four UK jurisdictions 
 
An outline of the different approaches to social housing procurement across the UK is set out in 
Table One. In England, ‘Investment Partnering’ was introduced in 2004, which reduced the 
number of directly funded developing housing associations from 400 to around 70. Other 
associations joined consortia led by ‘Investment Partners’, with some eventually becoming 
involved in mergers or group structures (Mullins and Craig, 2005; Lupton and Kent-Smith, 
2012). At the same time private developers became eligible for grant. Bidders had to qualify as 
Investment Partners by demonstrating financial and technical capacity but they could so as 
single providers or as consortia (HCA, 2011). In Scotland, an attempt to introduce mandatory 
procurement groups was abandoned in 2009 after sector consultation provoked a negative 
response. By 2011, Scottish associations had formed seven development groups on a voluntary 
basis as well as groups for other reasons such as performance benchmarking (Turner and 
Townsend Consulting, 2011). As in England, a small number of local authorities were building 
again and therefore competing for subsidy. Consultation on a Procurement Reform Bill in 2012 
prompted debate about whether housing associations should continue to be treated as public 
bodies for the purposes of procurement, given that grant levels were now consistently below 50 
per cent (the attempt to gain exemption from the Bill was unsuccessful). In Wales, mandatory 
development consortia were introduced in 2005 and Welsh housing associations self-selected 
into six groups which also have wider procurement functions (Housemark Cymru, 2007). Welsh 
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public procurement policy placed great emphasis on social benefit, for example the use of social 
clauses (McClelland, 2012).  
 
Table One: Outline of social housing procurement process in UK jurisdictions 
Jurisdiction Programme Grouping 
required? 
Other comments 
England Affordable Homes 
Programme 2011-15; 
previously National 
Affordable Housing 
Programme 2008-11. 
No, but voluntary 
consortia are 
common to enable 
non- Investment 
Partners to access 
grant.  
Must qualify as Investment 
Partner with the Homes and 
Communities Agency if wishing 
to bid. Councils, ALMOs and 
private sector bodies may also bid 
for development funding. New 
‘affordable renting’ model 
different from rest of UK. 
Procurement Efficiency Initiative 
for materials/ supply chain and 
other purchases. 
Scotland Affordable Housing 
Supply Programme 
2012-13 to 2014-15; 
previously annual 
programmes. 
No, but 7 
voluntary 
development 
groups plus 
benchmarking 
groups. 
Councils may also bid for 
development funding. 
Procurement Reform Bill at 
consultation stage; SFHA 
opposing HA definition as public 
bodies and seeking legal opinion. 
Wales Social Housing 
Grant Programme 
(annual). 
Yes, 6 
development 
consortia, 
mandatory from 
2005. 
Strong overall procurement policy 
framework with emphasis on 
social benefit, acknowledged in 
McClelland Report (2012). ESF 
Convergence Programme funding 
obtained by Value Wales to 
improve capacity. 
Northern 
Ireland 
Social Housing 
Development 
Programme 2012-13 
to 2014-15 (rolling). 
Yes, 4 (now 3) 
PGs, mandatory 
from 2009. 
Some mergers and group 
structures taking place. NIAO 
(2012) report on all public 
procurement identifies potential 
for more savings. 
 
Northern Ireland, like Wales, required housing associations to be part of a procurement group in 
order to bid for development funding. The five-year Procurement Strategy aimed to ‘improve 
the social, economic and environmental return from investment in the Social Housing 
Development Programme; and procure the programme on a value for money basis and in 
accordance with best practice’ (DSD, 2008: 5). Programme bids were to be prioritised within the 
groups and submitted for funding annually, and a ten per cent efficiency savings target was set. 
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The initial focus was on procurement of new social housing, but it was intended that the groups 
would expand their purchasing functions over time.  
 
Thus there were different responses to the same EU procurement guidance. In England and 
Scotland, procurement groups or consortia were not compulsory for development fund bidding, 
perhaps because there was more of a mixed market of bidders including, in England, private 
companies and very large associations (Mullins, 2010). In Wales and Northern Ireland, 
development consortia/ procurement groups were mandatory. In both cases this provision 
appeared to stem from concerns about efficiency, given the number of small associations 
previously engaged in the bidding process (Housemark Cymru, 2007; DSD, 2008). This review 
shows that the devolved jurisdictions had some leeway in how procurement directives were 
interpreted, with the role of policy and regulation leading in some cases to voluntary partnerships 
(England and Scotland) and in others to mandated partnerships (Wales and Northern Ireland).  
 
Case study: social housing procurement in Northern Ireland 
 
Context 
 
This section reports the development of two case study procurement groups during 2011 and 
2012. Implementation of the Procurement Strategy took place within a changing policy 
environment which added to the uncertainty experienced due to the introduction of procurement 
groups as new mandated partnerships. First, the renewed focus on regulation and efficiency had 
led to poor ratings for almost half Northern Ireland’s housing associations and seven were 
suspended from development. Although the Procurement Strategy itself did not mention mergers 
or group structures, there was subsequent political pressure on associations to consider these 
(DSD, 2012) and also to use accumulated  reserves to subsidise new development 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2010). The consequences of austerity at UK government level and 
subsequent reduction of Northern Ireland’s block grant pointed towards falling public subsidy 
and greater reliance on private finance; in addition, welfare reform changes were likely to reduce 
rental income. Finally, the restructuring of the Northern Ireland Housing Executive was 
announced in 2012, creating further uncertainty about the future structure of social housing 
provision including the possible establishment of new stock transfer housing associations. 
 
The key drivers for the Procurement Strategy have been outlined earlier in the paper as EU 
procurement policy and the concern for greater efficiency in construction, along with the 
regulation of housing association performance. Key stakeholders and case study participants both 
identified the crucial influence of EU procurement policy, but efficiency in construction less so: 
 
       I feel the driver really has been European procurement regulations... as they have  
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become more and more firmed up, more and more definite, and government has insisted 
that we must adhere very, very closely to them, that has been the driver over the last five 
years, that has been the significant change. [Senior staff, PG1, 2012] 
 
The general importance of regulation was acknowledged, and participants believed DSD aimed 
to achieve better performance through a reduction in the number of associations (a point that was 
denied by DSD participants). However, it was suggested by some in the PGs that there was scope 
for larger associations to develop on behalf of smaller ones. A key conceptual counterweight to 
the notion of ‘economies of scale’ is that of ‘economies of scope’ which may be enjoyed for 
relationship-oriented activities (exploiting the existence of customer knowledge, team working, 
and partnership commitment) by providers with strong local and customer-based relationships 
who can more cheaply provide a wider range of services than less trusted providers (Rees el al, 
2012a). Some of the smaller associations we spoke to felt that local knowledge and involvement 
was important in the development process as well as in housing management (and acknowledged 
a connection between the two) and there were doubts about the extent of stated cost reductions.  
 
Structure, regulation and initial operations 
 
The delivery of the Procurement Strategy was the responsibility of the Department of Social 
Development (DSD), informed by  Northern Ireland’s overall Public Procurement Policy (DFP, 
2012) and monitored by the Central Procurement Directorate (CPD) in the Department of 
Finance and Personnel (DFP). A team from the CPD was seconded to the DSD to advise and 
assist on procurement issues including guidance and best practice. Delivery of the Procurement 
Strategy was co-ordinated by a Programme Board including staff from the DSD, the CFP, the 
Housing Executive, NIFHA, the Strategic Investment Board, PGs and the Construction 
Employers Federation (DSD, 2008: 18). The Programme Board was becoming more important 
during the later stages of our research, as it began to play a larger part in a more collaborative 
approach to the Strategy’s implementation. 
 
The two most powerful actors were the two government departments: the DFP for overall 
procurement policy and the DSD for policy implementation, monitoring of PGs and housing 
association regulation. Procurement policy actors in DFP were influential through their  team 
based in DSD and through changes to policy and guidance. There was some concern from 
associations that procurement policy had restricted opportunities for more innovative 
partnerships: 
 
... the procurement guidance that we have to follow, that doesn’t often encourage getting 
into supply chain, it doesn’t allow you to build up partnerships, it doesn’t allow you, you 
know, to develop those links with suppliers. So fundamentally we’re saying we can 
never do what you’re actually asking us to do.... [Senior staff, PG2, 2012] 
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Turning to the DSD, policy implementation was viewed by associations as prescriptive, but the 
DSD insisted that they had respected the independence of associations throughout, whilst 
maintaining (along with DFP officials) that close involvement was reasonable given the amount 
of public money received by associations as grant income and Housing Benefit payments. 
Although one PG participant had wanted the DSD to be more prescriptive, associations generally 
took the view that such close involvement with government departments could call into question 
their independence as third sector bodies. 
 
The number of procurement groups was stipulated in the Strategy as four, and these were 
formed in 2009, containing between six and ten housing associations. However, one group 
disbanded in 2010 and its members joined other groups. The Strategy’s ‘preferred option’ was 
that PGs should be established as a legal entity but only one of the three groups (PG1) took this 
advice. The other two, including our case study PG2, were based on memoranda of agreement. 
In both structures, each member association had equal voting rights whatever its size. Initial 
approval of PGs took place through the agreement of a business plan by the DSD. PGs were first 
operational for the 2009-10 grant bidding round. Business plans were the subject of a ‘mid-term 
review’ during 2011. Monitoring of PGs took place through the regular completion of a 27-point 
‘maturity matrix’ including aspects of strategic planning, budgeting, risk analysis, programme 
management, collaborative working, community consultation and health and safety (DFP, 
2006), along with the development of Key Performance Indicators, which was still in progress at 
the time of our research. The monitoring of procurement groups was much lighter than the 
regulatory framework for each housing association, and thus the DSD’s status as associations’ 
regulatory body remained important. Both case study PGs had associations suspended from 
development and in one case this had caused great difficulty for programme delivery. Another 
aspect of the DSD’s role was the political pressure from successive Ministers of Social 
Development for a reduction in the number of housing associations (DSD, 2012). Officials 
claimed to be neutral on this point but there was some doubt about this in the PGs. The proposed 
restructuring of the Housing Executive was of less interest to associations, although some saw 
potential opportunities for stock transfer and rationalisation under a new system. The Housing 
Executive remained an important part of the decision-making environment due to its day-to-day 
control of the Social Housing Development Programme; but less influential than the DSD or 
DFP. 
 
The importance of state agencies in the policy environment emphasised the degree to which 
housing associations were being treated as public bodies subject to regulatory control. This 
appeared not to cause concern to the one lender representative interviewed, who stated that the 
establishment of PGs had not led to any changes in their lending decisions and that they found 
the housing association inspection reports to be an important indicator of their financial viability 
[Lender, 2013]. Finally, we found no voice at all for tenants as end users in the development 
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process (although most associations included tenants on their Boards in relation to more general 
involvement in decision-making). The ‘maturity matrix’ provided only indirect reference to user 
benefits and although community involvement was measured, the specific interests of tenants 
were not included. In interviews it was felt that users’ interests were met through following 
DSD’s Housing Association Guide and by post hoc customer surveys. 
 
Processes, trust and power 
 
Formation of the procurement groups 
 
Procurement groups were formed and implemented in an environment of low trust between 
associations and the DSD. There was broad agreement from associations on the aims of the 
Procurement Strategy but considerable disagreement about the best way of implementing it. 
Some of our interviewees suggested that little attempt was made by the DSD to explain or 
discuss the rationale for this particular solution to generate economies of scale. This may be seen 
as a key weakness in drivers for partnerships which are known to work better where there is trust 
and ownership by the actors involved (Klijn et al, 2010); Rees et al, 2012a). Nevertheless, the 
DSD took the view that they had acknowledged and respected the independent third sector status 
of housing associations by allowing PGs to form and develop without interference, albeit within 
a mandated partnership structure. The high level of regulatory intervention against associations 
during 2008-09 provided a difficult context in which to introduce a new initiative. There was 
also a (less significant) issue of trust between associations. The Northern Ireland Federation of 
Housing Associations (NIFHA) had difficulty in asserting a united third sector identity given 
some emerging differences in approach and interests between members, including towards the 
imposition of procurement groups. 
 
The four (subsequently three) PGs were formed by associations themselves through a process of 
self-selection. Prior to 2009, apart from ‘development agency’ arrangements for smaller 
associations, there had been little joint working and thus the requirement to work together on 
new build development was a considerable cultural challenge for associations used to competing 
for development funding. Both case study PGs were formed using similar criteria despite their 
subsequent differing legal status. The most important factor was either an existing trust 
relationship or the potential for trust, given that most senior staff knew each other and the work 
of their organisations through policy networks: 
 
You could say a lot of it was relational: “Can we trust these people? [Senior staff, PG1, 
2012] 
 
Membership of PGs self-selected on the basis of difference rather similarity: both were diverse in 
terms of size, geographical remit and types of housing provided. No specialist groups were 
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formed, for example supported housing providers or within a particular geographical area. At 
first sight this appears counter-intuitive, but in interviews it was suggested that it was motivated 
by avoidance of partners who might seek to control or even take over their association. 
Interestingly, it appeared that it had been easier to build trust amongst organisations with a 
degree of dissimilarity, although this clearly introduced a need to understand the different 
cultures and priorities among partners with different institutional logics: 
 
... we’re not all of the same size, we’re not natural competitors with one another...  
there is a bit of trust that has been built up... [Senior staff, PG2, 2012] 
 
Once formed, the two case study groups adopted different approaches to the involvement of HA 
Board members and to the employment of staff. PG1 did not include its HA Board members in 
the decision-making process; PG2 did so, without appearing to blur the distinction between their 
role and that of senior staff. Of course, the Board members of individual HAs in both groups 
continued to make funding and programme decisions for their individual associations and to 
receive reports on the activity of their PG. PG2 recruited two paid staff whereas PG1 seconded 
staff from constituent associations. It is possible that these differences fed into a different overall 
dynamic in each PG as work progressed,  but in each case the agenda was driven very much by 
senior staff. The two PGs changed very little in structure and membership between 2009 and 
2012. In PG1 there had been two sets of association mergers with another under discussion; and 
in PG2 a group structure was being negotiated between two members.  
 
Working relationships 
 
It is not possible to state that working in PGs led to a straightforward increase or decrease in 
trust, or indeed to better or worse working relationships overall. What we can say is that the 
balance of trust and power within the groups differed. In one of our case studies (PG2) working 
relationships were generally good: in the other (PG1), there had been a breakdown in the 
relationship between two of the partners which had led to issues not being discussed and 
disillusion from the lead partner with the concept of PGs in general. Table Two shows these 
contrasting trajectories: the PG1 group, initially keen, had become disillusioned and trust had 
diminished. PG2, on the other hand, had moved from reluctant participation to somewhat greater 
enthusiasm, having maintained trust and mutual respect within the group.  
 
It is worth reflecting on the factors that may have caused these contrasting trajectories, as far as 
we can ascertain. Both PGs sought to enhance trust in the early days: 
 
And I think with our membership .... we have had a lot of meetings to get that 
relationship built up and the trust as well.  And that we can have our meetings and be 
honest about the risk associated with the schemes... [Senior staff, PG1, 2012] 
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… trust builds up because you see how people behave at meetings, you look at their 
work, you look at the quality of their work, you look at the services they provide… 
[Senior staff, PG2, 2012] 
 
Table Two: Changing attitudes towards procurement groups 2011-12 
 PG1 PG2 
August 
2011 
We felt it was the best… We  
didn’t agree to it just because it  
was in the strategy, we felt it was  
the best approach and we still  
think it’s the best approach  
[Senior staff ] 
 
... our mindset is, be fair to say probably 
started out one of absolute complete 
resistance and has slowly eroded into a 
submission… and into almost now one of, 
to be honest in which we’ve got no choice 
here.  This is the future, you know, there’s 
no other show in town.  And if we’re going 
to develop in any way in the future that’s 
the only way we’re going to 
develop...[Senior staff] 
August 
2012 
Hindsight is a wonderful thing, 
and looking back I mean I don’t 
see anything that has really come 
out of setting up the procurement 
groups that has been to our 
advantage. [Senior Staff] 
I suppose broadly we feel that we’re 
starting to reap the benefits now, plus we 
feel – I mean rightly or wrongly, we could 
be knocked down here, but we feel that we 
can show the DSD very specific gains now. 
[Senior staff]  
 
The size of the groups and the number of associations did not seem to make a difference,  
perhaps because every association had one vote in both groups. In PG1 (seven associations) a 
power struggle developed between the two largest associations, rather than between the larger 
and the smaller ones. In PG2 (five associations), collaborative working developed regardless of 
the size of associations, for example the Chair of the PG came from one of the smaller 
associations; and the largest one ‘lent’ development staff to a smaller one that was struggling 
with its programme delivery. It appears that PG2 adopted a more consensual style of decision-
making, which took longer and was criticised in the mid-term review. It is not clear whether the 
involvement of Board members in PG2’s committee structure contributed to better working 
relationships; however, it may have helped with information-sharing and with confirming 
legitimacy of the PG amongst PG2’s member associations. It is also possible that PG1’s 
decision to establish itself as a legal entity created a different decision-making environment to 
the trust-based partnership of PG2.  
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The Procurement Strategy espoused ‘a culture of collaboration’ (DSD, 2008: 6) and there is 
some evidence that this was achieved in PG2. On the other hand there was also an unintended 
consequence of curtailing earlier organic collaborations (such as maintenance or general 
purchasing) with associations in other PGs and holding up some merger opportunities. This was 
also found in Wales, where the mandatory structure strengthened relationships within 
procurement consortia but ‘restricted and closed down other relationships within the housing 
association sector as a whole’ (Card, 2009: 9).  
 
Single Development Teams and the ‘culture of collaboration’ 
 
The example of the moving towards single development teams (SDTs) for each PG illustrated 
the power dynamics between PGs and the DSD, as well as the power and trust relationships 
within each group. The 2011 mid-term reviews indicated that faster progress towards a SDT 
should be made in the interests of efficiency savings. A SDT tested the PG working 
relationships in a number of ways. It could lead to redundancies; difficulties in reaching 
agreement on common standards and procedures; and raised the question of whether the SDT 
should be employed by one housing association or by the PG itself; if the latter, its activities 
would be removed from the governance of Boards of Management who were accountable for 
development performance against grant allocation.  
 
Case study PGs had different attitudes towards the issue. The largest partner in PG1 was keen to 
form a single development team and had made some progress towards standardising scheme 
design across the PG. However, there was opposition from two other members and discussion 
on the matter within the group had largely stalled . It appeared that this issue had caused 
significant problems in the working relationships within this group. The largest association was 
disappointed that the DSD had not been more proactive in requiring PGs to adopt SDTs. This 
association was now exploring an alternative model, whereby they would obtain grant and build 
on behalf of smaller associations, who would purchase the units on completion. PG2 had been 
opposed to a single development team in 2011 but in 2012 they were developing their own 
model of collaborative working through ‘integrated teams’, shaped by the demands of the DSD 
but also suited to their own needs, perhaps assisted by the positive experience of sharing 
development staff in the interim: 
 
... we will do that through the harmonisation of our procedures... eventually we might  
have a planning feasibility team, we might have a procurement team, we might have  
an asset management team, and there might be leads within each organisation and so  
forth to take that forward... [Senior staff, PG2, 2012] 
 
Whilst PG2 succeeded in integrating some development functions, PG1 encountered opposition 
and was unable to impose a single team against the wishes of the rest of the PG. Instead, the 
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largest association in this group was investigating the possibility of developing on behalf of 
smaller group members, but acting as a single association rather than as a PG. Thus a more 
flexible collaborative trust based approach was proving more successful in effective deployment 
of development team resources than the attempt of a lead association to use their power over 
others. The DSD also chose not to use their power to insist on a particular structure and, indeed, 
it is arguable that they could not in fact have done so within the structures adopted by either PG. 
 
Outcomes and learning points 
 
The priorities for the PGs were to develop a commissioning framework for consultants and to 
prioritise bids from their members for the annual bidding round for the Social Housing 
Development Programme (SHDP). The original intention was that PGs would develop a single 
commissioning framework to allow the purchase of integrated supply teams, covering 
professional services and building contractors. In the end, the contractor element was deferred 
because there was no guarantee of work to the value of the relevant EU threshold. Interestingly, 
the prioritisation of the annual bidding round appears to have gone smoothly despite being the 
greatest test of the working relationships. At a time when less development funding was 
available, associations appeared able to assess the viability of schemes within their PGs in a 
constructive manner. 
 
There were delays in proceeding to incorporate other forms of procurement into the groups, 
partly due to pre-existing contracts. PG1 had remained with new build procurement only, a 
framework agreement for contractors for all planned and cyclical maintenance was being 
advertised and a response maintenance service was planned to include all except one of the 
group’s members. PG2  had established a measured term maintenance contract for all its 
members and had also diversified into other areas such as furniture, white goods, stationery and 
food for supported housing projects. The Procurement Strategy’s target of ten per cent 
efficiency savings over a four-year period had been easily met (a figure of 17 per cent was 
quoted by one group) but this is not surprising at a time of declining tender values and it is hard 
to determine whether savings can be attributed to the new structures or to more general market 
conditions. There was a view from some participants that tender costs were being driven down 
to the extent that quality might be affected and product innovation and good design 
compromised.  
 
On a very basic level, PGs delivered in that SHDP new build targets were exceeded for the first 
three years of their operation (Figure One), in contrast to the year before when there was a 
shortfall. However, it is impossible to say whether the targets would have been equally well met 
without PGs. Consideration of costs and benefits does not seem to have taken into account the 
additional staff and other costs to housing associations, with no comprehensive cost benefit 
analysis of the implementation costs carried out by the DSD. That, along with the lack of a 
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direct comparator in Northern Ireland (because PGs were mandatory), made it difficult to assess 
their effectiveness. Furthermore, the concerns of some interviewees about quality, including 
higher maintenance costs that would have to be met out of future rents, cannot be ignored. 
 
Figure One: Northern Ireland’s Social Housing Development Programme  
outputs 2008-09 to 2011-12 
Financial year 
(* = PGs not operational) 
Target Total starts or 
acquisitions 
*2008-09 1500 1136 
2009-10 1750 1838 
2010-11 2000 2418 
2011-12 1400 1410  
Source: NIHE (2012); NIHE (2013).  
 
In broader terms, PGs may be seen to represent the working out of competing institutional logics 
(Mullins, 2006) with resulting long term consequences for the sector. On one side, the 
establishment of PGs was a hierarchical process with the state very much in control. On the 
other, government wanted to increase third sector involvement in public service delivery 
through partnership working based on trust and equality. Equally, the benefits of private sector 
borrowing were crucial at a time of austerity. Case study participants therefore had different 
views about the future of PGs, reflecting their contrasting experiences of the process: 
 
What’s the point of partnership working if it’s not producing anything?  
[Senior staff, PG1, 2012] 
 
Even if the DSD tell us, you’re stopping existing, sorry, [PG2] doesn’t stop existing, 
because we have contracts with a whole range of other organisations.  
[Senior staff, PG2, 2012] 
 
While one PG moved from reluctant compliance to recognising some real benefits through a 
collaborative trust based process, the other which had initially been enthusiastic felt that there 
was little benefit in continuing with their group due to the absence of the control based sanctions 
inherent in a hierarchical approach. This evidence supports the role of trust and collaboration as 
essential partnership ingredients and the limitations of an externally mandated approach if 
control sanctions are not maintained. 
 
Conclusion  
 
This  paper has explored the nature and operation of social housing procurement groups as a 
mandated form of third sector partnership. These partnerships are located within complex 
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network governance structures in which trust and power dynamics co-exist in an uneasy 
relationship. Housing associations have become hybridised through participation in these 
structures, whilst still retaining their primary civil society identification. Examination of the 
operation, relative advantages and barriers to PG effectiveness has resulted in three key 
conclusions: that  hierarchical power is still important in network governance; that mandated 
partnerships shift the  balance from  trust to  power in partnership working, but impact is uneven; 
and that the process of hybridisation has itself been shaped by these processes. The case study 
contributes to research on organisational change in the provision of public services under 
marketised systems. 
 
First, hierarchical power is still important in network governance. Recent literature has 
questioned the assumption that networks are bastions of soft power, in which persuasion and 
negotiation are necessary because no one participant has enough power to act without the 
consent of others. It is now recognised that state agencies retain substantial power when 
replacing direct service provision with outsourcing and regulation. Such hard or hierarchical 
power, based on the control of resources, can erode trust. However, it remains possible to 
distinguish network governance from, say, Kooiman’s (2003) ‘top down’ hierarchical 
governance model, because there are also times when soft power prevails and the ‘co-
governance’ model appears more appropriate. In Northern Ireland’s social housing procurement 
groups state actors often set the agenda, for example the DSD’s imposition of the procurement 
groups structure and the use of DFP’s ‘maturity matrix’ monitoring process. However, on 
occasions the DSD was less prescriptive, for example on the membership and legal status of 
procurement groups and the formation of single development teams. Over time there was 
significant divergence between the two PGs studied, with the trust based PG building a more 
sustained commitment to a policy that had originally been opposed, while the more authoritarian 
PG could not sustain its authority in the absence of external hierarchical power.  
 
Secondly, mandated partnerships alter the balance between trust and power in partnership 
working, but the impact is uneven. A review of the literature concludes that ‘while there is 
theoretically no necessary conflict between competition and collaboration, in practice 
partnerships have tended to work more effectively when they are underpinned by voluntary trust 
based relationships rather than by imposed or mandated partnership forms or by competitive 
arrangements that undermine trust’ (Rees et al, 2012a: 52). In the NI PG case, treatment of 
housing associations as public bodies for procurement purposes reinforced hierarchical power  
through control over access to development funding. However, a weaker countervailing 
hierarchical influence, the Third Sector Concordat (DSD, 2011), might have provided greater 
space for trust based partnerships had  it been more central to the procurement process. 
Nevertheless there were clear examples of agency amongst those associations making more 
successful early adaptations to the procurement group regime, with key choices made over mix 
of partners and types of expertise required in the management of the network. Both PGs were 
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formed on the basis of trust,  but in one case trust was eroded and neither soft nor (external) hard 
power was able to replace it as an effective driver for day to day operations. In the other case, 
trust and legitimacy were enhanced over the period of the research. In practice, trust-based 
collaboration was  better correlated with performance than legal structures and top down control. 
If trust is indeed the currency of network forms of governance (Thompson, 2003) then the early 
difficulties encountered in maximising the intended benefits can be readily explained. 
Organisations entering mandated partnerships should be aware of the difficulties involved in 
working to externally directed criteria whilst maintaining trust-based working relationships; 
however, this research shows that it is still possible. It is important that the value of trust and 
voluntary engagement as key success conditions for partnerships is better understood. 
 
Thirdly the case of NI PGs indicates that the hybrid identities of the third sector organisations 
participating in the PGs have been actively shaped by this process. Housing associations in 
Northern Ireland  have moved away from their historical origins as a voluntary housing 
movement. In other parts of the UK, the biggest challenge to third sector identities has been a 
shift to private sector culture as a result of high levels of borrowing, the need to manage market 
risk and to follow the credit ratings (Mullins and Pawson, 2010). In Northern Ireland, the 
treatment of  housing associations as public bodies appears to pose the bigger risk. While they 
are referred to as private sector organisations in the Procurement Strategy (DSD, 2008), and were 
acknowledged to be  independent third sector organisations in the ‘hands off’ approach of the 
DSD during the formation of the PGs, the overall process was characterised by a high degree of 
state control consistent with associations’ definition as public bodies. This has challenged NI’s 
housing associations to assert the value of the market and civil society elements of their hybrid 
identities. The ability to harness private finance in a context where state funding has decreased to 
a minority component of new development funding provides a potential argument against the  
imposition of public sector hybridity. Meanwhile third sector identity may be welcomed in the 
post-Global Financial Crisis period in the redesign of public services to achieve budget 
reductions, while sustaining a degree of public support and engagement. In this context the 
balance between accountability for public funds and third sector independence can be hard to 
maintain, but organisational hybridity and trust-based networks could provide the basis for more 
productive working relationships with the state. 
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